The GAMA Corporation provides services to corporations and state and federal government e jencies in strategic planning and contingency preparedness. GAMA specifies in gaming and analyzing situations characterized by high uncertainty or adversarial positions; e.g.: Colombia's drug war; energy emergencies; natural disasters; R&D choices; and debt negotiations. Since 1985, the GAM» Corporation has conducted over 90 strategic planning and contingency gaming sessions. These projects have involved over 1500 participants.
Suck scenario-based planning and gaming is the process of developing plans wnich test, rather than assume, the responses of opposing powers or interest groups. GAMA uses electronic polling and computer techniques to capture the essence of what experts believe, and why. This method of structured planning sessions is intended not to predict a single-point outcome, but to increase the understanding of an issue by analyzing it from several perspectives, to include these with opposing objectives. I.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The use of gaming as a tool for strategic planning can yield both insights and consensus about major issues. 2. The central Soviet concern about SDI is not that it could prevent the assured nuclear destruction of CONUS; it is that it would confer upon the U.S. the capability to control space (Figure 2, p. 3), which has much broader day-to-day applicability than just the intercept of 1000 to 2000 RVs in a low probability SlOP-level exchange. 
3.
The Soviets know they cannot successfully compete against the U.S. SDI, with all that portends for space. There is a good chance the U.S. will continue SDI R&D through the 1990s at $3-4 billion per year. (Figure 3 , p. 5) If so, the U.S. will retain space-related R&D superiority over the Soviet Union. (Figure 4 , p. 6) Given militarily-applicable trends, the USSR will not diminish the current technology gap. (Figure 5 , p. 7) This R&D lead is significant for three reasons:
The incentive to develop a mutually acceptable path into the future increases markedly when an adversary knows he will fail in a competitive race.
For little more than one percent of the Defense budget, the SDI R&D program has yielded a large deterrent dividend;
without the expense of largescale procurements, it has created an incentive not to compete.
• Because the Soviets do not want to enter a space-based arms competition they believe they will lose, they are willing to discuss arms control alternatives.
The Soviet reaction to an actual Phase One deployment would be vehement and real; it would not be posturing. (Figure 6 , p. 12. According to this view which emphasizes cooperation more than competition, there is merit in a two-sided LPS which, at least in its formative stages, could not pass the test of being "militarily effective" because it cannot intercept thousands of RVs. But this view holds that "militarily effective" is a flawed criterion, as evidenced by the effect SDI has already had upon Soviet behavior, without one piece of hardware being deployed.
A program, like SDI, can be short of fulfilling traditional definitions of "military effectiveness", and still have a major impact upon national security, depending on its potential. 2) Build profits into R&D.
3) Solicit ideas from industry.
4) Stay away from the issue.
5) #1 and #3. 6) #2 and #3.
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II. PURPOSE.
Two issues were addressed.
1)
What are the major alternative approaches (decision paths) the Soviets could take to SDI over the next year?
How do these alternatives affect SDIO?
2) Given the FY90 appropriation, the events of the past several Gaming is a method of strategic planning under conditions of competition.
"Strategic thinking rarely occurs spontaneously. Formal planning provides the discipline to pause occasionally to think about strategic issues." "Every company should have a strategic plan. A good plan should contain an analysis of the logic of each competitor's strategy, how it thinks, and its likely future moves."
Excerpts from The Economist, 23 May 1987
Any organization does plan based on some view of the future, whether or not that view is made explicit. Gaming assists in strategic planning by providing alternative scenarios, or alternative futures.
Gaming does not predict a future or an outcome, but it can identify factors which a decisionmaker or a planner might otherwise overlook.
On 15 December, a modified-Delphi*, computer-aided gaming method was used to focus expert judgment upon alternative paths and outcomes which depend upon the interaction of adversaries. There were two teams. Each team met in caucus to address a series of questions, called a Charge. The teams then met in plenary session to exchange points of view and identify where they agree and disagree, and why.
B.
FOCUS.
The SDIO is a management system for R&D activities and programs; it is not a policy analysis or field agency. Its concern is the management of some of the world's most advanced and complex technologies.
The players were asked to view the discussions in the game through Delphi -Session D. GAME RULES.
• The first rule is that disagreements and contradictions are expected.
• The second game rule is that agency positions should not constrain the expertise of the individual players.
Institutional perspectives should be explained but no one is expected to speak as if he were the institution.
• The third rule is that the content of the game and any conclusions any participant chooses to draw do not, obviously, reflect the position or the endorsement of any government agency.
• The fourth rule is non-attribution.
After the game, remarks should not be attributed to any individual without his or her consent. The utility of sessions such as this is that all participants must feel free to express themselves.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS.
A. The wealth among nations will shift, as shown below. The Soviet Union will lose ground, comparatively speaking.
QNP
While its GNP per capita may rise from $7000 in 1990 to $8500 in 2010, the U.S. will increase from $19,000 to $27,000 and W.
Europe from $15,000 to $23,000.
B. The U.S.-Soviet conventional force balances in Europe by 1995 will be 10% to 25% less than in 1989.
V.
BACKGROUND ON MISSTONS FOR SDT.
According to former national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane, the concept of SDI originated informally in 1982 with the JCS. They were concerned that the deployment of accurate Soviet land-based missiles would not be countered by the actual deployment of an MX.
The JCS suggested a limited, ground-based BMD system to deny the Soviets confidence in an initial counterforce barrage.
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan proposed research on strategic defense, with the long-term hope that this could shift the basic strategic construct from deterrence based on retaliation and assured damage to security based upon defending the nations' peoples.
In October of 1988, the Defense Acquisition Board directed the SDIO to pursue the development of a "system of systems" of technologies, such that an informed decision whether to deploy a "Phase One" could be made in the early 1990s. 
VI. SCENARIO: A SOVTET PROPOSAL.
The conventional wisdom has been that the Soviets oppose SDI, do not want to modify the ABM Treaty and want to contintue to pursue an offensive-heavy doctrine.
Arguably, BMD of like effectiveness possessed by both sides would not degrade the political-military posture of the Soviet Union and might enhance it (by weakening the credibility of limited NATO first use while degrading the perceived capabilities of the UK, French and Chinese missile systems). Soviet objections to BMD, then, might be rooted more in a concern about whether BMD would really yield equal effectiveness to both sides than in a concern about strategic doctrines or military ideologies.
On the U.S. side, were there not an existing ABM Treaty, it would be hard to argue against some defenses on doctrinal grounds alone, if the technological progress since 1983 did offer both some population protection and some preferential defenses (e.g., of command control or leadership) at less expense than adding some new offensive systems.
However, given the ABM Treaty, then objections to SDI can be raised on the grounds of possible Soviet reactions, including: VII. MOVE ONE: Charge to Soviet Teams.
Gorbachev Memo to His Advisors.
1. The issue is how we deal with the U.S. SDI over the next year.
2. We should be prepared for the U.S. to pursue R&D of SDI at, say, $3-$4 billion for another ten years, perhaps longer. If we look long-term, does this gradually give them a breakout capability, or can we match their progress at that funding level?
3. Suppose we agreed to certain technology sharings in a cooperative venture (as they once alluded to).
Could we benefit politically?
Technologically?
Militarily?
In Economic Terms?
Given this guidance, the players were divided into Soviet Teams A and B and asked to discuss and respond.
A. Team A as Soviets: Discussion Results
1.
Soviet Goal: Stop SDI in space.
2. However, Soviets take N Country ballistic capability (especially PRC) seriously. So LPS is not ruled out.
Our preferred Soviet strategy is the status quo: insist that the U.S. cease threatening an arms race in the heavens. However, if the Americans remain obdurate and persist with serious SDI R&D, we need a fallback position to use a year from now.
4.
Via backchannel, eventually we would entertain a discussion about ground-based LPS.
5.
Assured destruction remains our baserock strategy, however.
B. Team B as Soyfcts; Discussion Results

1.
We would like some technical/technology upgrades.
2.
So we can see advantages in some cooperative Ground Based
Interceptors (GBI) versus accidental or unauthorized Third Nation launch.
3.
We would rather not amend the ABM Treaty, although we will agree with the U.S. about new interpretations, some perhaps novel.
• Perhaps -just perhaps -more than one launch site could be permissible.
• Cooperative, open test range(s) on both sides.
• Perhaps do so by on-site inspection of launch sites and even payloads.
• Some cooperation in space.
4.
If possible, place the onus on the U.S. to modify the treaty.
5.
In short, we are prepared to endorse LPS (look at Moscow!) if we can gain technically by sharing and if it gives us leverage against any American serious space-based efforts.
VIII. MOVE TWO: Charge to U.S. Teams
Memo From a Senior U.S. Official.
1. You are my advisors and I need advice.
2. Since we believe a Soviet first strike would be counterforce, Phase I essentially offers direct protection to some of our C3, land-based missiles, and leadership.
3. We have been pursuing Phase I R&D as a unilateral American program with emphasis upon space-based systems.
4. We might be able to agree to strategic arms reductions with a routine treaty provision allowing withdrawal whenever either side believed its "supreme national interests" were jeopardized. Under this scenario, we would proceed to test and deploy perhaps BSTS within the ABM Treaty guidelines. We might even test and deploy some ground-based interceptors (GBI). But Phase I cannot be credibly tested, let alone deployed, without either abrogation of the treaty or a new level of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.
5. On the one hand, SDI must be cooperative or mutual to succeed. On the other hand, sharing seems bizarre.
How does U.S. determine if it is better off without sharing, if this means not deploying for the foreseeable future?
6. Since, as long as glastnost persists, cooperation is the key to any serious strategic defense, are there areas in which we and the Soviets might cooperate?
Technically, is it out of the question to share in a serious manner? In 1983, we said we should share the benefits of SDI. Did we mean we would share R&D; or joint production; or joint deployment?
Given this guidance, again the players were split into Teams A and B and asked to discuss/respond.
A. Team A -as Blue: DlSCUSSion Results
1.
LPS provides a base which can be expanded in a crisis mobilization case.
2.
For the 90s, we must develop a theology of R&D without production. This applies across DoD, not just to SDL 3. In the Congress, there is a middle group who can be persuaded about a robust SDI R&D coupled with some LPS deployment, provided the spirit of the ABM Treaty is preserved and assured destruction is not precluded.
4.
The future of SDI will be driven by the changes in the U.S.
domestic setting and in the international setting.
5.
To preserve $4 billion per year for SDIO will require a different policy stance than Phase One. 
